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Abstract
In health economic evaluation studies, to value productivity loss due to absenteeism, existing methods use wages
as a proxy value for marginal productivity. This study is the first to test the equality between wage and marginal
productivity losses due to absenteeism separately for team workers and non-team workers. Our estimates are based
on linked employer-employee data from Canada. Results indicate that team workers are more productive and earn
higher wages than non-team workers. However, the productivity gap between these two groups is considerably
larger than the wage gap. In small firms, employee absenteeism results in lower productivity and wages, and the
marginal productivity loss due to team worker absenteeism is significantly higher than the wage loss. No similar
wage-productivity gap exists for large firms. Our findings suggest that productivity loss or gain is most likely to
be underestimated when valued according to wages for team workers. The findings help to value the burden of
illness-related absenteeism. This is important for economic evaluations that seek to measure the productivity gain
or loss of a health care technology or intervention, which in turn can impact policy makers’ funding decisions.
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Introduction
It is still under debate whether we should take account
of productivity gains or losses from a health care inter-
vention in economic evaluation studies [1, 2]. Cost-
effectiveness studies, for example, are routinely used to
determine the eligibility of health technologies such as
pharmaceuticals for coverage under national or provin-
cial health plans. The inclusion of productivity losses in
such analyses would have a significant influence on
determinations of cost-effectiveness, leading to different
resource allocation decisions. Krol et al. find that
accounting for productivity costs can either increase or
decrease the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)
between treatment arms [3, 4]. Thus, cost-effectiveness
studies that account for productivity losses are useful in
identifying interventions with a potentially broad impact,
and do not necessarily lower the ICERs of an
intervention.
Despite robust arguments in favour of including prod-
uctivity loss in evaluation studies [3–6], current methods
to value productivity loss are limited. Existing methods
usually quantify productivity loss using wages as a proxy
for marginal productivity [1, 7, 8]. However, wages may
not equal marginal productivity for many reasons, mak-
ing it a poor proxy and reducing the accuracy of esti-
mated productivity loss. In imperfect labour markets,
wages may not equal marginal productivity due to in-
equities, such as race or gender discrimination, whereby
an identifiable group routinely receives lower wages.
More commonly, risk-averse workers might willingly
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accept a wage below their marginal productivity in
exchange for job security, e.g. allowances for sick days
[9, 10].
A wedge between a worker’s wage and marginal prod-
uctivity may also arise if a job involves team production
or if the firm output is time-sensitive [9, 11]. Pauly et al.
presented a general model demonstrating that when
there is a team production and substantial team-specific
human capital, the value of lost output to the firm from
an absence will exceed the daily wage of the absent
worker and could be as large as the total output of the
team [9]. Similarly, the cost of an absence will exceed
the wage when a firm incurs a penalty if it misses an
output target due to the absence. In both situations, the
productivity loss could be reduced if replacements are
found who are either inexpensive or are close substitutes
for the absent worker.
Although there are many reasons that wage may
not equal marginal productivity, there is still lack of
empirical evidence on their equality with regard to
absenteeism and team participation. This is the first
study to empirically test the wage and marginal
productivity losses due to absenteeism and measure
the multiplicative effect of absenteeism for team
workers. This study examines the theoretical implica-
tions on the relationship between wages and product-
ivity when a job is involved in team production. Its
findings will help determine whether wages can be
used as a precise proxy of marginal productivity in
estimating productivity loss due to illness-related
absenteeism. In addition, we use a unique employer-
employee data, the Workplace and Employee Survey
(WES). The advantage of these data is that they con-
tain information on a firm’s output, capital, materials,
other expenditures, payroll, and industry as well as
its workers’ age, sex, education, occupation, team
participation status and absenteeism. The availability
of such data allows us to test the equality of wage
and marginal productivity for groups of workers with
different characteristics. The WES is one of only a
few linked employer-employee databases worldwide
and the only one for Canada. Furthermore, we con-
duct robustness checks using alternative specifica-
tions and dropping some of the assumptions. We
find that our estimates of wage and marginal prod-
uctivity losses due to absenteeism appear relatively
robust and reasonable. We also divide the full sample
into small firm and large firms and examine whether
our estimates vary by firm size.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 contains the conceptual framework and a
short review of related studies. In section 3, we present
our empirical specification. Section 4 describes our data
and defines the main variables. In section 5, we present
our findings and parameter estimates. Section 6 summa-




A large literature has documented substantial wage
differentials on the basis of firm size [12, 13], indus-
try [14–16], group or non-group work [17, 18],
union and non-union contracts [19, 20], business cycle
[21, 22], competitiveness of the industry [23, 24], and gov-
ernment regulation [25, 26]. These wage gaps are conven-
tionally estimated from a wage regression using
individual-level data. Without an independent measure of
worker productivity, however, it is difficult to determine
whether these estimated wage differentials reflect product-
ivity differentials or other factors such as wage discrimin-
ation [27, 28]. Hellerstein et al. have developed a
framework to simultaneously estimate firm-level wage
equations and production functions on population-based
datasets that link employees’ input to their employers’ out-
put [27, 28]. Their approach yields estimated marginal
productivity differentials and wage differentials for
workers with different characteristics, and a framework to
test their equality.
Hellerstein and Neumark use Israeli labour market
data to test whether the wage gap between men and
women exceeds the gap between them (if any) in
marginal productivity [27]. Hellerstein et al. use US
population data to estimate wage and marginal prod-
uctivity differentials for worker groups with different
age, sex, and race characteristics [28]. Many recent
studies have applied the Hellerstein et al. framework.
For example, Haegeland and Klette analyze wage and
productivity gaps among Norwegian workers grouped
by sex, education and work experience [29]; van
Ours and Stoeldraijer identify 13 studies on age,
wage and productivity using linked employer-
employee data [30].
Our theoretical framework is based on Pauly et al. [9].
They develop a general model to examine the magnitude
and incidence of costs associated with absenteeism
under alternative assumptions about firm size, the pro-
duction function, the nature of the firm’s product, and
the competitiveness of the labor market. We test two
key theoretical predictions of their model using the Hel-
lerstein et al. [27] and Hellerstein and Neumark [28]
framework.
The first prediction is that the productivity loss associ-
ated with a worker’s absence will be larger than the wage
in firms with team production. If a team worker is ab-
sent, the output of the entire team may be affected.
Hence the impact on firm output exceeds the wage that
would have been paid to the absent team worker. We
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test the hypothesis that the absence of team workers has
a larger effect on firm-level production than wages (i.e.,
a significant difference between productivity effects and
wage effects). In contrast, we hypothesize that the
absence of non-team workers has a similar effect on
production and wages.
The second prediction is that the difference between
the wage and the productivity loss due to absence will
be larger in small firms than large firms. While large
firms can hire extra employees to ensure that a given
output level can be maintained if a team worker is
absent, small firms may not be able to afford this ex-
pense. We test whether the difference between product-
ivity effects and wage effects is larger in small firms than
large firms.
Previous literature on the impact of absenteeism and
team on wages and production
A related literature seeks to uncover factors that de-
termine or affect worker absence by modeling absence
[17, 31–35] or focuses on the association between
health conditions and absenteeism [36–39]. Few stud-
ies have estimated the impact of absenteeism on
wages or production, and none have examined
whether their impact varies by team work status and
firm size.
Allen estimates the trade-off between wages and
expected absence via a hedonic wage equation using
individual worker level data in 1970s, and the effect
of absenteeism on output per man-hour via a plant-
level production function for manufacturing [40]. He
finds a small difference between the wage effect and
the productivity effect. However, he uses different
data for the effects and does not estimate the two
equations simultaneously. Thus, the absence-rate co-
efficients from the two equations might not be
comparable.
Several studies have estimated the impact of absentee-
ism on productivity using plant-level data. In the pro-
duction function of Allen [40], the elasticity of the
absence rate is −0.015, meaning an increase in the
absence rate from 0.1 to 0.2 reduces the output per
man-hour by 1%. In addition, Mefford examines the
effect of unions on productivity in 31 plants of a large
multinational firm from 1975 to 82 [41]. He also in-
cludes the absence rate into the production function and
finds that the elasticity of the absence rate is −0.033, im-
plying if the absence rate increases from 0.1 to 0.2, prod-
uctivity will decrease by 2.3%. The direction of the
estimated effect in our study is consistent with these
previous studies yet the magnitude of the effect size is
greater.
Coles et al. introduced the idea of the shadow cost of
absenteeism: the relatively high wage paid by firms
requiring a low level of absenteeism, to compensate
workers for attending work reliably [17]. They use just-
in-time as an indicator of an assembly line production
process. Using individual worker level data, they find an
association between higher wages and lower absence
rates; however, the relationship is almost twice as steep
in just-in-time firms contrasted to non-just-in-time
firms.
Measure of compensation
Wage rate versus the impact of absenteeism on aggregate
wages
In the absenteeism literature, the measure of opportun-
ity cost of absenteeism is usually proxied by the worker’s
wage rate (wage per unit time) taken from firm data. In
this paper, however, the wage cost of absenteeism comes
from an estimate of the impact of worker absenteeism
on aggregate wages for workers at a firm. It may dif-
fer from a direct measure of the wage rate because
the equilibrium wage incorporates any effects of ab-
senteeism as a compensating differential. For example,
the observed wage per day may vary much less be-
tween a firm where (for some exogenous reasons) ab-
senteeism is common and one where it is rare than
does the estimate from our wage regression. Most im-
portantly, with only an aggregate measure of output
available, we prefer to use the aggregate wages at the
firm level in order to obtain the most comparable es-
timates. As Hellerstein et al. pointed out, by jointly
estimating the firm-level production function and
wage equation, we can conduct straightforward statis-
tical tests of the equality of wages and marginal prod-
uctivity [27]. Furthermore, the biases from some
unobservables are more likely to affect the estimated
absenteeism impacts on productivity and wages simi-
larly when both are estimated at the firm level. Their
impact on the tests of the equality of marginal prod-
uctivity and wages is therefore diminished.
Payroll and non-wage benefits
In our main analysis, we use payroll as a measure of
compensation. Payroll or wage is only part of the total
employee compensation. Non-wage benefits are also
available to employees, e.g., health related benefits (e.g.
dental care, life insurance), pay related benefits (e.g.
severance allowances), or pension related benefits. As a
robustness test, we also use the total compensation (pay-
roll plus non-wage benefits) as the outcome in our wage
equation.
Measure of absenteeism
Because we are primarily interested in estimating the
productivity loss due to illness for applications in
health care economic evaluation studies, an ideal
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measure of absenteeism would reflect illness-related
absences only. However, data limitations dictate that
we rely on a broader measure of absenteeism. The
WES data used in this study only measure absences
due to paid sick leave, but not unpaid sick leave. Fol-
lowing the definition of Dionne and Dostie [32], our
measure of absenteeism includes the number of days
of paid sick leave; other paid leave encompassing edu-
cation leave, disability leave, bereavement, marriage,
jury duty, and union business; and unpaid leave. It
does not include paid vacations, paid paternity/mater-
nity leave, or absence due to strikes or lock-outs. Al-
though our measure of absenteeism is broader than a
pure measure of illness-related absenteeism, our find-
ings are still useful to determine whether wages are a
reasonable proxy of the productivity loss due to
illness-related absenteeism under the assumption that
illness-related absenteeism and other forms of paid
and unpaid leave have a similar impact on wages and
output.
Methods
Our empirical analysis is based on two firm-level
equations which we specify and estimate jointly: a
production function and a wage equation. The pro-
duction function is used to capture productivity ef-
fects related to absenteeism and team work at the
firm level, and the wage equation is to capture the
corresponding wage effects. By simultaneously esti-
mating the two equations, we can compare the prod-
uctivity effects with wage effects to determine the
equality of marginal productivity and wages. The trad-
itional approach of estimating the wage equation
alone to measure the impact of absenteeism does not
fully capture productivity differentials associated with
different levels of absenteeism.
We think it is useful to baseline our results with an es-
timate of economy-wide aggregate effects. Thus we
begin by estimating a baseline model that restricts the
effect of absenteeism to be the same for team workers
and non-team workers and in small and large firms. We
subsequently relax these restrictions by assuming that
absenteeism affects team workers and non-team workers
differently, and then by estimating our model separately
for small and large firms.
Production function
Our baseline specification of the production function is an
extension of the standard Cobb-Douglas [27, 28, 42, 43].
See Additional file 1: Appendix B for its complete devi-
ation. Because the Cobb-Douglas form is restrictive, we
assess the robustness of our estimates to more general
alternatives described in Section 3.4.
For each workplace, we start with a simple Cobb-
Douglas production function:
InQj ¼ α InLAj þ β InKj þ ηFj þ μj ð1Þ
where Qj is output, measured as value added by firm j;
LAj is an aggregate labour input defined below, Kj is the
capital stock, Fj is a matrix of various firm characteris-
tics, α, β are the elasticity of output with respect to
labour and capital, respectively, η is a vector of parame-
ters for firm characteristics and μj is the error term.
We divide the labour input into different worker types,
that is, workers with different characteristics such as
age, sex, education, occupation and team participation.
If the total number of characteristics is I and workers
are divided into Vi categories by each characteristic i,
then the total number of worker types will be
Y
i¼1I V i .
Our aggregate labour input LAj can be simplified after
making several assumptions: First, we assume perfect
substitutability among all types of workers and different
marginal productivity for each worker type [27, 28]. Sec-
ond, we assume that the proportion or distribution of
one type of worker defined by one characteristic is con-
stant across all other characteristic groups, which is re-
ferred to as the equi-proportionate restriction [27, 28].1
Third, we assume the relative marginal productivity of
two types of workers within one characteristic group is
equal to those within another characteristic group,
which is referred to as the equal relative productivity re-
striction [27, 28].2 Fourth, attendance rates have the
same marginal impact on productivity for different
worker types.
The aggregate labour input can then be written as
















where aj is the absence rate in firm j, Lj is the number of
all workers in the firm j, PGj is the proportion of team
workers among all workers in the firm j, i = 1, 2, …, I-1
indicates worker characteristics other than team partici-
pation, vi = 1, 2, …, Vi-1 represents worker categories
divided according to the worker characteristic i, Pivj ¼ LivjLj
is the proportion of the worker type iv among all workers
in the firm j, θ is the parameter of (1-absence rate), i.e.,
the attendance impact on the marginal productivity for
any worker type, λ0,I is the marginal productivity for the
reference group when work force is divided by I character-
istics and absence rate = 0, γG is the relative marginal
productivity of team workers compared to non-team
workers, and γiv ¼ λivλio is the relative marginal productivity
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of one worker type iv to the worker type i0 for each char-
acteristic i.
By substituting LAj into the simple production function,
equation 1, we obtain our baseline specification (equa-
tions 9 and 10 from Additional file 1: Appendix B), i.e., a
“restricted model” as follows:
InQj ¼ β0 þ β InKj þ α InLj þ αθ In 1−αj
 
þα In 1þ γG−1
 
PGj














Ej refers to workforce characteristics other than team
participation, and β0 is a constant term that incorporates
a In λ0,I.
In addition, we relax the fourth assumption for team-
work participation, that is, the attendance impact on the
marginal productivity for team workers (θG) is different
from that for non-team workers (θN). A relatively
“complete model” (equations 12 and 13 from Additional
file 1: Appendix B) is therefore presented as:
LAj ¼ λ0;I 1−aj
















lnQj ¼ β0 þ β lnKj þ α lnLj
þ αθN ln 1−aj





þ αEj þ ηFj þ μj
ð6Þ
Wage equation
Applying the same approach as above, wage effects can
be estimated through the relationship between payroll
and average absence rate and share of workers partici-
pating in a team at the firm level. We write the aggre-
gate wage wj as the sum of wage for each worker type.
Applying the same assumptions in the production func-
tion, the aggregate wage can be simplified as:
wj ¼ w0;I 1−aj
 ζ









where wj is the annual payroll of firm j, w0,I is the wage
for the reference group when work force is divided by I
characteristics, ζ is the parameter of attendance rate, i.e.,
the attendance impact on wages for any worker type, ϕG
is the relative wage of team workers to non-team
workers, ϕiv ¼ wivwi0 is the relative wage of one worker type
iv to the worker type i0 for each characteristic i other
than team participation.
After log transforming equation 7, the “restricted
model” for wage equation is written as:
lnwj ¼ βw0 þ βw lnKj þ αw lnLj þ ζ ln 1−aj
 
þ ln 1þ ϕG−1ð ÞPGj











βw0 is a constant term incorporating w0,I, αw, βw are
the elasticity of wage with respect to labour and capital,
respectively, ηw is a vector of parameters for firm char-
acteristics and μw,j is the error term.
Correspondingly, we assume the attendance impact on
wages differ by team participation and thus the relatively
“complete model” becomes:
wj ¼ w0;I 1−aj














lnwj ¼ βw0 þ βw lnKj þ αw lnLj
þ ζN ln 1−aj
 





þ Ewj þ ηwFj þ μw;j ð11Þ
where ζN is the impact of attendance rate for non-team
workers and ζG is the impact of attendance rate for team
workers.
Estimation
We estimate the production function and wage equa-
tion simultaneously via nonlinear least squares (NLS)
[27, 28]., under the assumption that errors are corre-
lated across equations (nonlinear seemingly unrelated
regression).3 All observations are weighted using
linked weights provided by Statistics Canada. All
standard errors are computed as Statistics Canada’s
recommended procedure [44] using 100 sets of pro-
vided bootstrap sample weights.
Our null hypothesis of primary interest is that the at-
tendance coefficient in the production function equals
the coefficient in the wage equation. In the restricted
model, the equality of marginal productivity and wage is
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tested by comparing the attendance coefficients, θ and ζ.
In the complete model, we compare the two coefficients
for team workers, θG and ζG, and those for non-team
workers, θN and ζN, respectively. We also test the equal-
ity of relative productivity of team workers to non-team
workers and their relative wage by comparing (λG − 1)
and (ϕG − 1).
In order to examine whether parameter estimates vary
by firm size, we conduct our analyses separately on two
sub-samples: small firms with less than 20 employees
and large firms (the remainder).
Robustness
We undertake further analyses to assess the robustness
of our estimates. First, we relax restrictions on the func-
tional form of our production function by estimating a
specification using the much more flexible translog
form. Second, we re-estimate our model using total
compensation (payroll plus non-wage benefits) instead
of payroll as the outcome of the wage equation.
Third, a key issue in the estimation of production
functions is the potential correlation between input
levels and unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks.
Firms that have a large positive productivity shock may
respond by using more inputs, giving rise to an endo-
geneity issue [45]. Following Hellerstein et al. [27], we
address this issue by using value-added as the measure
of output in the production function to avoid estimating
a coefficient on materials. We also attempt to correct for
the potential bias by estimating the model on first differ-
ences, which eliminates the effect of any time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity that jointly affects productivity
and wages. We also apply Levinsohn and Petrin’s ap-
proach [46] using intermediate inputs (expenses on ma-
terials which are subtracted out in our value-added
production function) to address the simultaneity prob-
lem. Specifically, we estimate parameters of our value-
added production function using NLS by adding a third-
order or a fourth-order polynomial approximation in
capital and material inputs [47].
Finally, we conduct sensitivity analyses to examine the
impacts of some of the assumptions embodied in our
baseline specification. We relax the equi-proportionate
restriction between occupation, age, sex, education (>
university bachelor versus bachelor and below) and team
participation, respectively.4 That restriction also implies
that the firm-average absence rate is common to all
worker types. To test the impact of this assumption, we
allow the average absence rate to differ for team workers
and non-team workers in each firm. That is, the firm-
average absence rate in the complete model is replaced
with the firm-average absence rate of team workers and












































lnQj ¼ β0 þ β lnKj
þα lnLj þ αθN ln 1−aNj
 








þαEj þ ηFj þ μj
ð14Þ
Data
The WES is a survey of Canadian employers and em-
ployees conducted by Statistics Canada over the period
1999–2006 [48].5 These data have been used to estimate
age-based wage and productivity differentials [49] and to
compare wages and marginal productivity for workers
with different levels of education and technology use
[50, 51].
The sampling frame for the WES includes all Canad-
ian workplaces6 in the Statistics Canada Business Regis-
try that had paid employees in March of the survey year.
The sampling frame for employees comprises all em-
ployees working at or on paid leave from the targeted
workplaces in March. In each year between 1999 and
2006, Statistics Canada surveyed a representative sample
of approximately 6000 workplaces. The initial sample of
workplaces was refreshed in odd-number years (2001,
2003, and 2005) to reflect attrition and firm births. In
1999–2005, Statistics Canada randomly sampled ap-
proximately 20,000 employees of sampled firms. The
number of employees sampled from a firm was propor-
tional to size, up to a maximum of 24. In workplaces
with fewer than 4 employees, all employees were sam-
pled. Sampled workers were surveyed for two years, and
a new sample of workers was drawn in the next odd-
numbered year.
Ethical approval for this study is not required because
it was based exclusively on the WES conducted by Sta-
tistics Canada and we did not directly approach the
study subjects. Our analysis is based on the pooled data
1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005 cross-sections.7 We further
restrict the sample to workplaces with at least one em-
ployee interviewed, operating for profit, and with
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positive output. Our sample includes 18,381 observa-
tions on 7766 unique workplaces. There are 7784 obser-
vations for small firms and 10,597 for large firms.
Table 1 illustrates the transition from the gross work-
place sample to our final sample in detail.
Outcome variables
Our outcome variable in the wage equation is the firm’s
total annual payroll. Our outcomes variables in the pro-
duction function is the firm’s output. Following Turcotte
and Rennison [50, 51], we define output as value added,
where value added is measured as annual gross operat-
ing revenues minus expenses on materials.8 Expenses on
materials equal annual gross operating expenditures
minus total gross payroll and expenditures on non-wage
benefits and training.
Independent variables of interest
Our measure of absenteeism is the absence rate of the
firm’s employees. This is defined as the number of days
of total leave taken by employees, including paid sick
leave, other paid leave (e.g., education leave, disability
leave, bereavement, marriage, jury duty, union business)
and unpaid leave [32] in the past 12 months or since the
employee started his/her current job (if less than 12
months), divided by the total number of ‘usual work-
days’9 over the same time period. The absence rate for a
firm is the average absence rate for the employees sur-
veyed at that firm. We define the firm’s attendance rate
as one minus the absence rate.
We identify workers as being a member of a team
based on their reported participation in “a self-directed
work group (semi-autonomous work group or mini-
enterprise group) that has a high level of responsibility
for a particular product or service area” [48].10 In our
analysis, team workers are those who report participat-
ing in such a group ‘frequently’ or ‘always’ and non-team
workers are those who report participating in such a
group ‘occasionally’ or ‘never’.
The Lj in our baseline specification is measured by the
number of total employees employed by each workplace.
Estimation of our production function also requires a
measure of the firm’s capital stock. Unfortunately, there
is no such measure in the WES. We therefore impute
the firm’s capital stock following the approach of Dostie
[49] and Turcotte and Rennison [50, 51]. Our imputed
capital measure equals the five-year average capital stock
in the firm’s industry, divided by the number of firms in
each industry represented by the WES. The industry
capital stock measure is the geometric (infinite) end-year
net stock of non-residential capital reported in CANSIM
Table 031–0002, obtained from Statistics Canada.11
Control variables in our empirical specification include
other characteristics of the firm’s workforce (firm-aver-
age proportion of employees grouped by age, sex, educa-
tion, occupation, race, immigration status, and
membership in union or collective bargaining agree-
ment, separately, included in Ej), workplace characteris-
tics (an indicator for selling into an international
market, an indicator for foreign country ownership, re-
gion, and industry included in Fj), and calendar year
dummies. More details on the definition of all variables
we used in the study can be found in Additional file 1:
Appendix A.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for variables
used in our analysis. At the workplace level, the average
absence rate is low (0.02), of which 65% is unpaid leave,
19% is paid sick leave and 16% is other paid leave. The
share of workers in teamwork is 8%. The average age is
40 years old and the share of female workers is 54%.
Only 38% of workplaces have at least 5 employees sur-
veyed. The average number of employees per firm is 15
and most firms (85%) fall in the category of 1–19 em-
ployees. There are more large firms sampled in the WES
survey than small firms (Table 1). However, the small
firms are assigned higher sampling weights than large
firms to represent their much greater number in the
Canadian economy.
Results
Table 3 presents parameter estimates for our baseline
model, which provides an estimate of the economy-wide
aggregate effect of absenteeism. With the full set of con-
trols, our estimate of the overall effect of attendance on
marginal productivity (0.46) is almost identical to its es-
timated effect on wages (0.47). We cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that the two coefficients are the same at
conventional significance levels. These coefficients can
be interpreted as elasticities: a 1% decline in the attend-
ance rate reduces productivity by 0.95*0.46% = 0.44%12
and wages by 0.47%.
In Table 4, we relax our baseline specification by
allowing the coefficient on the attendance rate to differ
for team workers and non-team workers. The impact of
attendance is much larger for team workers: coefficients
Table 1 Transition from the gross sample to the final sample
Observations Workplaces
Gross sample 43832 9372
At least one employee without attritiona 36579 8875
For profit 31786 7931
Value added >0 30416 7812
Odd years 18381 7766
Small firms 7784 3870
Large firms 10597 4385
aIn even survey years, employees who had a different employer or left his
employer and did not have a new employer were considered as attrition
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are 2.38 in the production function and 1.43 in the wage
equation. In this specification, the total effect of attend-
ance (or absenteeism) on wages and productivity de-
pends on both these coefficients and the proportion of
employees that work in a team. Fig. 1. plots the rate at
which productivity and wages decline when the absence
rate increases by 0.1, at various levels of the firm’s ab-
sence rate and proportion of team workers. For example,
at a firm where all employees work in teams, an increase
in the absence rate from 0.1 to 0.2 reduces output by
23.4% and wages by 15.5%. At a firm where 20% of em-
ployees work in teams, output would only decline by





Value added (,000) 1393.333 38.705
Log value added 12.526 0.026
Total wage (,000) 524.346 10.281
Log wage 11.892 0.021
Employment 14.982 0.242
Capital stock (,000) 1254.673 59.224
Absence rate 0.019 0.001





Proportion of workers by age
Age <35 0.353 0.006
35≤ Age < 55 0.525 0.007
55≤ Age 0.123 0.005
Proportion of female workers 0.542 0.007
Proportion of workers by level of education
< High school 0.130 0.005
High school graduate only 0.203 0.007
Under university bachelor (completed/s
ome college or university)
0.539 0.007
University bachelor 0.092 0.003
> University bachelor 0.035 0.002





Production workers 0.200 0.006
Others 0.068 0.004
Proportion of ethnic minorities 0.187 0.006
Proportion of immigrants 0.179 0.006








500 employees or more 0.2








Foreign country owned 3.3
Industry
Forestry, mining, oil, and gas extraction 1.5
Labour intensive tertiary manufacturing 3.3
Primary product manufacturing 1.2
Secondary product manufacturing 2.0
Capital intensive tertiary manufacturing 2.6
Construction 8.2
Transportation, warehousing, wholesale 12.1
Communication and other utilities 1.3
Retail trade and consumer services 33.7
Finance and insurance 5.3
Real estate, rental and leasing operations 4.2
Business services 13.2
Education and health services 9.7














Employer weight is used for workplace characteristics; linked weight is used
for workforce characteristics
aunweighted estimates
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8.6% and wages by 7.2%. Correspondingly, the difference
between the attendance impact on marginal productivity
and the impact on wage for team workers is also larger
than that for non-team workers (0.95 versus −0.02)
(Table 4). However, the gap is not statistically significant.
In Table 5, we further relax our baseline restrictions
by estimating the model separately on sub-samples of
small and large firms. The impact of non-team workers’
attendance on output and wages is smaller for small
firms than for large firms: coefficients are 0.47 versus
1.32 in the production function and 0.44 versus 1.08 in
the wage equation. As hypothesized, the difference be-
tween the two effects are not significantly different from
zero in small firms (0.03) or large firms (0.24). In con-
trast, the impact of team workers’ attendance is much
larger for small firms than for large firms. The product-
ivity coefficients are 4.97 versus −0.76, and the wage co-
efficients are 2.25 versus −0.33, for small and large firms
respectively. The difference between the attendance im-
pact on output and that on wages is much larger in
small firms (2.72) than in large firms (−0.43). The results
suggest that in a large firm where all employees work in
teams, absenteeism do not have any substantial impact
on output or wages. On the other hand, absenteeism sig-
nificantly reduces output and wages in small firms where
all employees work in teams. The reduction in output is
significantly higher than the reduction in wages at the
10% significance level. The results are consistent with
our hypothesis that the absence of team workers has a
larger effect on firm-level production than wages in
small firms.
Our estimates of the relative productivity and the rela-
tive wage of team workers versus non-team workers
imply that team workers are more productive and earn
more than non-team workers in the full sample (Tables 3
and 4). This difference is statistically significant at the
5% level in the specification including all controls. The
difference between relative productivity and relative
wage is larger in small firms but smaller in large firms
(Table 5). This implies that on average, the higher wages
paid to team workers are considerably less than their
productivity differential relative to non-team workers.
In Additional file 1: Appendix C, we present parameter
estimates for all covariates that are included in the
models of Table 3 to Table 5, as well as the results of
various robustness checks. These include estimates
based on a translog production function (estimated on
the full sample) and using total compensation (payroll
plus non-wage benefits) as the outcome of the wage
equation. The estimates from these alternative specifica-
tions are similar to what we have obtained above. When
we consider different absence rates for team workers
and non-team workers, the coefficients do not change
much, which suggests our main analyses are robust.
When the equi-proportionate restriction is dropped for
occupation, age, sex and education with team participa-
tion, the estimated coefficients change only slightly.13
Nevertheless, the qualitative nature of the results stay
the same after relaxing these assumptions.
We have also re-estimated the model by excluding the
capital stock and the attendance rate coefficients remain
virtually identical. Therefore, we believe that our param-
eter estimates are robust to our (imperfect) measure of
the capital stock.
We address the potential endogeneity of absenteeism
and team work status in several ways. First, we have
Table 3 Parameter estimates for the restricted model
Production P value Wage P value
Baseline controlsa
Log (total no. of employees) 0.94 (0.02)*** <0.001 1.04 (0.01)*** <0.001
Log (capital) 0.04 (0.01)*** <0.001 0.05 (0.01)*** <0.001
Attendance rate 0.42 (0.12)*** <0.001 0.41 (0.07)*** <0.001
Team 0.66 (0.19)*** <0.001 0.40 (0.08)*** <0.001
Difference in attendance rate coefficients 0.01 (0.10) 0.958
Difference in team coefficients 0.26 (0.14)* 0.056
All controlsb
Log (total no. of employees) 0.95 (0.02)*** <0.001 1.08 (0.01)*** <0.001
Log (capital) 0.00 (0.01) 0.931 −0.03 (0.01)*** 0.002
Attendance rate 0.46 (0.13)*** <0.001 0.47 (0.07)*** <0.001
Team 0.26 (0.11)** 0.021 0.08 (0.05) 0.110
Difference in attendance rate coefficients −0.01 (0.10) 0.953
Difference in team coefficients 0.18 (0.09)** 0.037
aModel adjusted for employment, capital stock, and years; bAdjusted for employment, capital stock, occupation, age, sex, education, race, immigrant, bargaining
agreement, international market, foreign owned, region, industry and year; Standard error in the bracket; ***p ≤ 0.01; **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1
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estimated the equations in first differences to remove
any time invariant components of the model as a sensi-
tivity analysis. The first differences estimates reported in
Additional file 1: Appendix C are similar to the NLS es-
timates. Differencing does not eliminate the effect of
correlated transitory shocks, however, and these are
another potential source of bias. For example, a chem-
ical spill accident may instigate sick leave and a reduc-
tion in output. Employee work attendance decisions also
depend on the slope of the wage-absence tradeoff, which
may introduced simultaneity problems [40]. In the pres-
ence of correlated transitory shocks or simultaneity, an
Table 4 Parameter estimates for the complete model
Production P value Wage P value
Baseline controlsa
Log (total no. of employees) 0.94 (0.02)*** <0.001 1.04 (0.01)*** <0.001
Log (capital) 0.04 (0.01)*** <0.001 0.05 (0.01)*** <0.001
Attendance rate, non-team workers 0.37 (0.12)*** 0.002 0.38 (0.07)*** <0.001
Attendance rate, team workers 2.78 (1.44)* 0.054 1.83 (0.84)** 0.029
Team 0.75 (0.17)*** <0.001 0.45 (0.08)*** <0.001
Difference in attendance coefficients, non-team workers −0.01 (0.10) 0.876
Difference in attendance coefficients, team workers 0.95 (0.95) 0.318
Difference in team coefficients 0.30 (0.12)** 0.011
All controlsb
Log (total no. of employees) 0.95 (0.02)*** <0.001 1.08 (0.01)*** <0.001
Log (capital) 0.00 (0.01) 0.935 −0.03 (0.01)*** 0.002
Attendance rate, non-team workers 0.43 (0.13)*** <0.001 0.45 (0.07)*** <0.001
Attendance rate, team workers 2.38 (1.40)* 0.090 1.43 (0.75)* 0.058
Team 0.32 (0.12)** 0.012 0.10 (0.05)** 0.041
Difference in attendance coefficients, non-team workers −0.02 (0.10) 0.816
Difference in attendance coefficients, team workers 0.95 (1.00) 0.341
Difference in team coefficients 0.21 (0.10)** 0.030
aModel adjusted for employment, capital stock, and years
bAdjusted for employment, capital stock, occupation, age, sex, education, race, immigrant, bargaining agreement, international market, foreign owned, region,
industry and year; Standard error in the bracket; ***p ≤ 0.01; **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1
Fig. 1 Rate at which output and wages decline for a 0.1 increase in the absence rate, at various levels of the firm’s absence rate and proportion
of team workers
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instrumental variable (IV) approach [30, 52, 53] can be
used to consistently estimate parameters. We have esti-
mated IV specifications of our model using the lagged
attendance rate as an instrument. However this instru-
ment turns out to be weak (F-statistic < 10), and we were
unable to identify other valid instruments in the
WES. We therefore adopt the Levinsohn and Petrin
approach [46] and obtain estimates similar to our
main findings. Overall, we find our estimates to be
stable across different specifications, and this provides
strong evidence in support of our main conclusions
that wages underestimate the productivity loss due to
absenteeism in the presence of team production,
especially in small firms.
Discussion and conclusions
This study is the first to test the equality of the esti-
mated absenteeism impacts on marginal productivity
and wages using linked employer-employee data. Our
findings support the theoretical predictions of Pauly et
al. [9, 11] and provide compelling evidence that the
productivity loss due to worker absence exceeds the
wage for team workers, especially in small firms.
Our findings highlight that the productivity loss due to
absenteeism among team workers substantially exceeds
the wage in small firms. Interestingly, such a wage-
productivity gap is absent in large firms. This may reflect
differences in compensation policy between large and
small firms, or differences in substitution possibilities.
While team workers are more productive and earn
higher wages than non-team workers, our findings fur-
ther imply that their higher marginal productivity ex-
ceeds the wage premium they receive. Moreover,
although we find that wages underestimate the product-
ivity loss due to absenteeism for team workers, our esti-
mates indicate that wages are reasonable estimate of the
productivity loss due to absenteeism for non-team
workers.
It is worth noticing that this study is an aggregate or
ecologic study that has focused on the effect of team
work at the firm level rather than at individual worker
level due to a lack of individual-level output data. Thus,
it might be subject to ecological bias. According to
Greenland and Morgenstern [54], ecological bias can
occur if confounders or other factors affecting output or
wages are differentially distributed across firms (i.e.,
Table 5 Parameter estimates for the complete model by firm size
Small firms Large firms
Production P value Wage P value Production P value Wage P value
Baseline controlsa
Log (total no. of employees) 0.87 (0.03)*** <0.001 1.04 (0.02)*** <0.001 1.07 (0.02)*** <0.001 1.01 (0.02)*** <0.001
Log (capital) 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.005 0.04 (0.01)*** <0.001 0.09 (0.01)*** <0.001 0.08 (0.01)*** <0.001
Attendance rate, non-team workers 0.39 (0.14)*** 0.005 0.36 (0.08)*** <0.001 1.95 (0.80)** 0.015 1.66 (0.58)*** 0.004
Attendance rate, team workers 6.34 (2.25)*** 0.005 3.01 (1.03)*** 0.004 −0.57 (0.76) 0.449 −0.02 (0.70) 0.974
Team 0.75 (0.27)*** 0.005 0.35 (0.10)*** <0.001 0.71 (0.15)*** <0.001 0.63 (0.12)*** <0.001
Difference in attendance coefficients,
non-team workers
0.04 (0.11) 0.745 0.29 (0.36) 0.429
Difference in attendance coefficients,
team workers
3.33 (1.59)** 0.036 −0.55 (0.70) 0.431
Difference in team coefficients 0.40 (0.21)* 0.056 0.08 (0.10) 0.433
All controlsb
Log (total no. of employees) 0.88 (0.03)*** <0.001 1.07 (0.02)*** <0.001 1.10 (0.02)*** <0.001 1.03 (0.02)*** <0.001
Log (capital) 0.00 (0.02) 0.939 −0.03 (0.01)*** 0.006 0.00 (0.01) 0.879 −0.01 (0.01) 0.263
Attendance rate, non-team workers 0.47 (0.14)*** 0.001 0.44 (0.06)*** <0.001 1.32 (0.70)* 0.061 1.08 (0.47)** 0.021
Attendance rate, team workers 4.97 (1.87)*** 0.008 2.25 (0.95)** 0.018 −0.76 (0.73) 0.300 −0.33 (0.64) 0.609
Team 0.33 (0.18)* 0.073 0.06 (0.06) 0.260 0.19 (0.10)* 0.054 0.09 (0.07) 0.213
Difference in attendance coefficients,
non-team workers
0.03 (0.12) 0.811 0.24 (0.37) 0.511
Difference in attendance coefficients,
team workers
2.72 (1.49)* 0.068 −0.43 (0.72) 0.549
Difference in team coefficients 0.27 (0.16)* 0.091 0.10 (0.07) 0.157
Small firms are those with less than 20 employees; large firms are the remainder
aModel adjusted for employment, capital stock, and years
bAdjusted for employment, capital stock, occupation, age, sex, education, race, immigrant, bargaining agreement, international market, foreign owned, region,
industry and year; Standard error in the bracket; ***p ≤ 0.01; **0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; *0.05 < p ≤ 0.1
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confounding by firms) or when the effects of absentee-
ism and team work on output and wages vary across
firms (i.e., effect modification by firms). To minimize the
bias, in our regression models, we have adjusted for
firms’ workforce characteristics that potentially affect
output and wages, which were derived from individual-
level worker data. Furthermore, we are more interested
in the equality of the effects of absenteeism and team
work in the two equations: production equation and
wage equation. By jointly estimating the two equations
at the firm level, the bias is more likely to affect the esti-
mated effects on output and wages similarly [27] and
thus the impact of bias on the tests of the equality of
marginal productivity and wages might be diminished.
Collectively, our findings help to value the burden of
illness-related absenteeism, by establishing situations
where the wage can be used as a reasonable proxy for
lost productivity, and situations where it will underesti-
mate the loss. This is important for economic evalua-
tions that seek to measure the productivity gain or loss
of a health care technology/intervention, which in turn
can impact policy makers’ funding decisions. Other re-
searchers have proposed a multiplier to adjust wages to
estimate the productivity burden of illness or the prod-
uctivity gain from a health care intervention [9, 11, 55].
Our study provides a justification for such a multiplier.
In practice, the productivity loss can be estimated by cal-
culating the measured number of absent workdays due
to health problems, multiplied by the daily wage and the
multiplier.
Finally, we have deliberately avoided being prescriptive
with respect to the method that should be employed in
measuring productivity losses in economic evaluations.
We believe that the appropriate measurement approach
(which we focus on above) has many dimensions and in
this study our intention was to highlight the welfare eco-
nomic implications of under/over estimating productiv-
ity impacts due to absenteeism. We hope that the debate
on the inclusion or exclusion of productivity losses in
economic evaluations will be informed by this work over
and above the normative aspects of the controversy.
Endnotes
1For example, older workers are assumed to be equally
represented among team workers and non-team
workers; the distribution of absence rate is the same
across different worker types.
2For instance, the relative marginal productivity of
older workers versus younger workers among team
workers is assumed to be the same as those among non-
team workers.
3We have also estimated the equations in first differ-
ences to remove the firm-level fixed effects. The esti-
mates were similar to the NLS estimates but very
imprecise due to the large number of implied firm ef-
fects relative to the sample size. The results are included
in Appendix C.
4For example, when dropping the restriction between
sex and team participation, we allow the proportion of
team workers to differ in female and male employees.
The new specification includes the proportion of female
team workers, proportion of male team workers and
proportion of female non-team workers as the independ-
ent variables.
5Only employers were surveyed in 2006.
6Employers in Yukon, Nunavut, and the Northwest
Territories are excluded from the survey, as are those
operating in crop production, animal production, fishing,
hunting and trapping, private households, religious orga-
nizations and public administration.
7We do not use data from even-numbered years for
two reasons. First, employee attrition is high in their sec-
ond survey year and is likely nonrandom [56]. Second,
many sampled workers change employers between sur-
vey years and only limited information is collected about
their new employer.
8Using value added as an output measure helps ad-
dress the potential endogeneity of materials by avoiding
estimation of a coefficient on materials [27, 50, 51]. An-
other advantage of a value-added specification is that it
improves comparability of data across industries and
across workplaces within industries when their degree of
vertical integration differs [27].
9The total number of usual workdays equals to the
number of days per week that employees usually work
multiplied by the number of weeks per year they usually
work.
10More information on self-directed work group was
provided in the question, i.e., “In such systems, part of
your pay is normally related to group performance. Self-
directed work groups: 1) Are responsible for production
of a fixed product or service, and have a high degree of
autonomy in how they organize themselves to produce
that product or service. 2) Act almost as ‘businesses
within businesses’. 3) Often have incentives related to
productivity, timeliness and quality. 4) While most have
a designated leader, other members also contribute to
the organization of the group’s activities.”
11Although firms in the WES are classified into indus-
tries according to 6-digit North American Industry Clas-
sification System (NAICS) (a total of 837 unique
industries), the capital stock information provided by
Statistics Canada is only available for 247 industries at
varying levels of NAICS detail (2–6 digits, depending on
industry). The 247 industries are not exclusive because
both higher level and lower level of their NACIS are in-
cluded for some industries. Eventually, a total of exclu-
sive 201 NACISs are used: 2 in 2 digits, 70 in 3 digits,
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107 in 4 digits, 20 in 5 digits and 2 in 6 digits. Hence, to
impute a net stock estimate, we had to impute some
firm’s capital stock using the average value in a higher-
level aggregate of the firm’s industry.
12Note the output elasticity of labour is 0.95.
13Results are not presented but will be available upon
request.
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